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Burning Man: A Case Study of Altruism
Thriving in a For-profit Organizational
Form and the Rationales for LLC-toNonprofit Conversion
Yuan Ji*
Burning Man is a temporary city of over 50,000 citizens that exists for
one week every year in Nevada’s Black Rock Desert. Burning Man is
perhaps best known in popular culture for its celebration of interactive art,
experimental community building, gift economy, and ritual burning of a
large wooden structure in the shape of a man. The case study of Burning
Man is used to illustrate that an altruistic organization, one that is
ideologically committed to the provision of public goods and not driven by
profit, can nevertheless thrive in a for-profit legal form while staying true to
its mission. Depending on organization-specific conditions, the nonprofit
form can be, but does not necessarily have to be, the best structure for the
provision of altruism and public goods (or quasi-public goods). As an
organization evolves and becomes more complex overtime, however, the
organization form that best serves its mission can change as well. Still, the
nonprofit form alone neither guarantees altruistic commitment nor is
immune from abusive practices within the management or board of
directors. This article discusses the theories on nonprofit formation that
make persuasive rationales for Burning Man’s conversion to a nonprofit
structure; it also makes specific recommendations for better organizational
accountability and transparency in the Project’s current and future
operations.

* Associate, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati; J.D., Yale Law School; M.S. & B.A.,
Washington University in St. Louis. The author is grateful to Professors Robert Ellickson,
Henry Hansmann, and Susan Rose-Ackerman for their guidance; Marian Goodell for her time;
and the editors of the Hastings Business Law Journal for their assistance. All opinions and
impressions stated are the author’s alone; they have not been reviewed by the Burning Man
organization or by its legal and tax advisers.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Vigorous debate on what is the right choice of organizational
form for business enterprises has arisen in a wide array of sectors,
ranging from the contemporary women’s movement to the day care
industry.1 An important subset of this debate focuses on the choice
between for-profit and nonprofit forms for organizations with
altruistic missions, asks what is the most appropriate form for the
provision of public goods, and offers theories on whether public
subsidies like tax exemption or grant funding should be conditional
on the recipient’s nonprofit status.2 This article contributes to this
debate the unusual and fascinating case study of Burning Man, a
temporary city that flourishes in the desolation of the Nevada desert
for one week every year and disappears with no trace at the end of
that week, at least until its rebirth the next year. Burning Man’s story
is the story of an altruistic organization that, despite its indifference to
profit making, made the unintuitive but right choice to operate as a
for-profit Limited Liability Company (“LLC”) in the beginning. As
Burning Man evolved and matured overtime, however, so has the
organizational form that would best advance its values and goals.
This article is my humble gift to the citizens of Burning Man and

1. See, e.g., REBECCA L. BORDT, THE STRUCTURE OF WOMEN’S NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS 9–11 (1997); Elizabeth Mauser, The Importance of Organizational Form:
Parental Perception versus Reality in the Day Care Industry, in PRIVATE ACTION AND THE
PUBLIC GOOD 124 (Walter W. Powell & Elisabeth S. Clemens eds., 1998).
2. See, e.g., Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: The Economic Convergence of the
Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457, 535–56 (1996)
(arguing that nonprofits and for-profits are subject to overlapping economic conditions and
therefore more similar than conventionally believed, and suggesting that similar organizations
should receive similar tax treatments regardless of differences in their organizational forms);
Henry B. Hansmann, Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organization, in THE NONPROFIT
SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 27, 28–33 (Walter W. Powell ed., 1987) (summarizing the at
times competing and at times complementary economic theories on nonprofit formation by
various scholars) [hereinafter Hansmann I]; Henry B. Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting
Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 55 (1981) (arguing
that the tax exemption of nonprofits is justified because of the extra difficulty nonprofits face in
raising capital, and that such tax exemption is a useful public subsidy in industries that are better
served by nonprofits than by for-profit firms) [hereinafter Hansmann II]; Anup Malani & Eric
A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 VA. L. REV. 2017, 2023 (2007) (proposing that
for-profits engaged in charitable activities should receive identical tax treatments as their
nonprofit counterparts, because tax subsidies for charitable activities should not be conditional
on organizational form); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Altruism, Nonprofits, and Economic Theory,
34 J. ECON. LIT. 701, 723–24 (1996) (concluding that the nonprofit form instills more trust in
consumers with imperfect information about service quality, provides an outlet for individuals’
generosities, and is favored by ideological entrepreneurs who do not care about profit
maximization).
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to Black Rock City LLC,3 the organization that makes Burning Man
possible. It makes a two-fold contribution to the for-profit versus
nonprofit debate on organizational forms.
First, an altruistic
organization, one that is ideologically committed to the provision of
public goods and not driven by profit, can nevertheless thrive in a forprofit legal form and stay true to its mission. Depending on
organization-specific conditions, the nonprofit form is not necessarily,
at least in the company’s early days, the only or the best structure for
the provision of altruism and public goods (or quasi-public goods).
However, as an organization evolves and its needs take on more
complexity, the legal form that would best further its altruistic
mission can change as well. The second proposal made in this article
is that even if a for-profit form was once an equally good or better
alternative for an altruistic organization, the nonprofit form can
become the best fit once the organization reaches advanced stages of
institutional evolution and learning. This recommended transition to
a nonprofit structure should be qualified with the following advice: A
for-profit altruistic organization should not blindly convert to a
nonprofit structure without weighing benefits like favorable tax
treatments and grant funding against costs such as the loss of
organizational flexibility and the danger of commercialization.
What relevance can one offbeat organization’s story add to the
existing scholarship on organizational forms and nonprofit formation
theories? A case in point is American Online’s (“AOL”) recent $315
million acquisition of the Huffington Post from Arianna Huffington
in February 2011. The sale has been vehemently criticized as an
exploitation of writers’ and bloggers’ free labor for Arianna
Huffington’s personal gain.4 Those who contributed their time and
labor without pay did so because they wanted to contribute to a
liberal media alternative that is free from corporate ownership and
committed to the dissemination of knowledge and opinions; the fact
that the Huffington Post has been sold for some individual’s private
gain is an unexpectedly disappointing betrayal.5 The Huffington Post
controversy illustrates that even for readers who have never heard of
(let alone care about) Burning Man, this case study should
nonetheless offer food for thought to citizens who care about the
3. To be consistent with the lingo within the organization, I will interchangeably refer to
Black Rock City as the Burning Man organization or the Project.
4. See, e.g., David Carr, At Media Companies, A Nation of Serfs, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/14/business/media/14carr.html; Bill Lasarow, Why Our
Writers Are on Strike Against the Huffington Post, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 5, 2011), http://www.
guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/mar/05/huffington-post-aol.
5. See Paul Harris, Arianna Huffington’s AOL Deal Sparks Accusations of a Political Sellout, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 27, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2011/feb/27/ariannahuffington-post-aol-deal.
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provision and funding of public goods, and to ideological
organizations that either currently operate in or are contemplating a
nonprofit structure.
A business’s choice of organizational form is important because
of its impact on institutional behavior and consistency with the
organization’s mission. For participants and volunteers who are
drawn to and become emotionally invested in an organization
because of its ideological commitments, as is the case for Burning
Man, this choice is all the more important because these individual
attachments hinge substantially on the following conviction: The
Burning Man experience is provided through an organizational form
that is appropriate for the Project’s altruistic mission.
Although the Burning Man experience has no real substitutes, it
does have themes in common with some preexisting cultural
phenomena. Variations of potlatch, the deliberate distribution and
destruction of accumulated wealth as a form of gift giving, have been
practiced by cultures like certain indigenous communities in North
America’s Pacific Northwest Coast.6 Extravagant to the point of
financially ruinous at times, gifts of material goods are ostentatiously
given away or destroyed at these ceremonial gatherings to mark
milestone events in the community like marriages and deaths, or to
compete with rival clans in a showdown for prestige and social status.
The impersonal, transaction-based nature of capitalism has inspired
in intellectuals and popular culture alike the yearning for a purer,
more genuine form of personal relations, the community-sustaining
kind found in primitive nonmarket societies.7
Burning Man
encapsulates all of the above values and much more.

6. See MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT: THE FORM AND REASON FOR EXCHANGE IN
ARCHAIC SOCIETIES 31–41 (1954); see also Bruce Johnsen, The Formation and Protection of
Property Rights Among the Southern Kwakiutl Indians, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 41, 41 (1986)
(adopting a rational-actor view of potlatching as a well-developed system of exclusive property
rights among the Southern Kwakiutl Indians). Various ethnographies written by Franz Boas,
the anthropologist who in the late 1800s produced the first documentations of potlatch, are also
good background readings on the subject. See, e.g., Franz Boas, The Social Organization and
the Secret Societies of the Kwakiutl Indians, in SOURCE BOOK IN ANTHROPOLOGY 389 (A. L.
Kroeber & T. T. Waterman eds., 1920).
7. See Robert V. Kozinets, Can Consumers Escape the Market? Emancipatory
Illuminations from Burning Man, 29 J. CONSUMER RESEARCH 20, 29 (2002); AVATAR (20th
Century Fox 2009) (portraying the mining company RDA as a corporate machine that values
profit over life with no regard for its actions’ destructive consequences for the Na’vi
community).

JI (DO NOT DELETE)

Spring 2013

3/31/2013 11:33 PM

BURNING MAN

453

(Aerial photo of the 2009 Burning Man. Photo Credit: Scott London)

Aerial photos of Burning Man8 reveal a fingerprint etched in the
desolation of northwestern Nevada’s Black Rock Desert. A less than
fully formed sundial, partitioned by radial spokes branching
symmetrically away from the circular epicenter in which the Man
stands: This is an image that many Burners know by heart, a visual
echo of the “Welcome home” that they are greeted with every year
upon entering the gates. For one week every August, Burning Man
reawakens. During this week, a mirage of art festival and intentional
community fueled by astounding and spontaneous creativity is reality
on Black Rock Playa, a dry and ancient lakebed of chalky white dust
and flat nothingness located on federal land.
As the largest Special Recreation Permit use in the country
granted by the U.S. Department of Interior’s Bureau of Land
Management, Burning Man is a real metropolis with its own roads,
street signs, municipal airport, newspaper, radio station, café,
recycling center, public service volunteers, and law enforcement.9 On
the Saturday before Labor Day every year, a forty feet wood-andneon Man standing atop a base of roughly equal height is set on fire,
8. AERIAL PHOTO OF BURNING MAN, available at www.deepbottle.com/img/Fun/the-duststorm-burning-man-2010/the-dust-storm-burning-man-2010-04.jpg (last visited Nov. 10, 2012).
9. Burning Man is, as of 2006 and most likely will continue to be, the beneficiary of the
largest Special Recreation Permit in the country. Burning Man Timeline, BURNING MAN,
http://www.burningman.com/whatisburningman/about_burningman/bm_timeline.html
(last
visited Nov. 10, 2012). For a sampling of civilian life and civil institutions within Black Rock
City, see Lee Gilmore & Mark Van Proyen, Introduction, in AFTERBURN: REFLECTIONS ON
BURNING MAN 1, 3–4 (Lee Gimore & Mark Van Proyen, eds., 2005); see also The Playa: Black
Rock City Really Is A City, BURNING MAN, http://www.burningman.com/on_the_playa/ (last
visited Nov. 10, 2012).
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illuminating the event’s watershed moment against a backdrop of
desert night sky. Some elaborate art installations—products of
massive expenditures in labor, time, and money—are also burned
(most of the time intentionally, but not always).10 The burning of art
is not merely tolerated at Burning Man; it is a time-honored tradition
with the sanction of fire marshals.11
Though ultimately no amount of words can adequately
encapsulate the Burning Man experience, Part II introduces the
Project through a brief outline of its history and values. It also
discusses the reasons behind Burning Man’s adoption of the current
LLC form and the tentative plan for its transition to a nonprofit
structure. Part III stresses the importance of organizational form for
business enterprises by first offering a literature review on the ways in
which organizational form affects institutional behavior. Next, it
highlights three alternative organizational forms for Burning Man:
the nonprofit, the LLC, and hybrid for-profit/nonprofit forms. An
examination of various theories on nonprofit formation reveals that
the best rationales for Burning Man’s conversion to nonprofit status
are its need to credibly signal altruism and access to public subsidies.
Part IV defends the Project’s ability to uphold its altruistic mission as
a for-profit LLC, reflects on the nonprofit form’s advantages and
caveats, and makes recommendations for Burning Man’s future
operation.

II. MEET BURNING MAN
It is remarkable to think about Burning Man’s evolution over the
past twenty-five years: What started in 1986 as an informal gathering
of two friends who decided to burn a wooden man on San Francisco’s
Baker Beach, and the crowd of strangers spontaneously drawn to the
flames, has developed into a fully functional temporary city of over
50,000 denizens.12 The ritual of burning the Man belies the real
essence of this community. Burning Man is not strictly an art festival,
gift economy, intentional community, pilgrimage, or experimental
temporary city: It is all of these things in one.
10. See BRIAN DOHERTY, THIS IS BURNING MAN: THE RISE OF A NEW AMERICAN
UNDERGROUND 150 (2006).
11. Art burns at Burning Man are not free-for-all affairs and have been subject to
restrictions due to environmental damage concerns since around 1999. DOHERTY, supra note
10, at 187 (2006); see Open Fire Guidelines, BURNING MAN, www.burningman.com/
installations/open_ fire.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2012).
12. The 2010 census for Burning Man is 51,454. Black Rock City, TWITTER, http://twitter.
com/blackrockcity/status/27265721545 (last visited Nov. 10, 212).
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Creativity, collaboration, participation, and gift giving are
fundamental to Burning Man. They are themes that run through
Burning Man’s Ten Principles including decommodification,13 radical
self-reliance, radical self-expression, and participation.14 Commercial
sponsorships, advertisements, and transactions are banned at the
event to preserve the spirit of gift giving and to promote participatory
experience over passive consumption.15 Each individual is invited to
be a participant rather than a spectator, and self-expression is viewed
as a gift to others in the community. The ways in which an individual
can participate in Burning Man are limitless; one can, for example,
make art, interact with others’ art, organize a theme camp, or
volunteer for one of the numerous civic organizations within Black
Rock City. Ultimately, it is up to the individual to decide how to
contribute and express oneself.
It would be a challenge to categorize the type of people who
participate in Burning Man, as Burners come in all kinds. They
include, to name a few, fire spinners and welders, academics and
artists, fishermen, and the founders of Google.16 Most are American,
Caucasian, between the age of twenty-five and fifty, and hold college
or advanced degrees.17 The male to female ratio is roughly one to
one, and a significant contingency work in informational technology
sectors in the San Francisco Bay Area.18
Art is ubiquitous at Burning Man. Larry Harvey, the director of
the Project’s Senior Staff and a mastermind figure who came up with
the idea to burn the first Man on Baker Beach back in 1986, picks a
theme every year as a way to unify the artworks and citizens’
contributions in Black Rock city.19 The theme can manifest itself in
interactive theme camps, large-scale art installations, gifts, costumes,
or any medium of one’s choice. In 2001, a nonprofit 501(c)(3) branch
13. With the exceptions of ice, coffee, and tickets at the gate, there is nothing for sale at
Burning Man. DOHERTY, supra note 10, at 5.
14. Ten Principles of Burning Man, BURNING MAN, http://www.burningman.com/whatis
burningman/about_burningman/principles.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2012).
15. Id.
16. See DOHERTY, supra note 10, at 11; Fred Turner, Burning Man at Google: A Cultural
Infrastructure for New Media Production, 11 NEW MEDIA SOCIETY 73, 75 (2009).
17. See Kozinets, supra note 7, at 23; DOHERTY, supra note 10, at 10; AfterBurn Report
2008, BURNING MAN, http://afterburn.burningman.com/08/census/index.html (last visited Nov.
10, 2012) (reporting that of the 2008 Burning Man participants surveyed, 73 percent considered
themselves to be white, 85 percent reported that they were eligible to vote in the United States,
and 68 percent held bachelor’s or higher degrees).
18. AfterBurn Report 2008, supra note 17; accord Turner, supra note 16, at 74–75.
19. What Is Burning Man, BURNING MAN, http://www.burningman.com/whatisburningman
(last visited Nov. 10, 2012). The 1998 Burn was the first to have a unifying art theme. For a list
of themes and photos of corresponding artworks from previous years, access the Art Installation
Archive at the bottom-right corner of http://www.burningman.com/art_of_burningman.
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of Black Rock City LLC, the Black Rock Arts Foundation
(“BRAF”), was created to award honoraria funding for artists’
proposed art installations.20
Despite commonalities it shares with other festivals, gatherings,
and intentional communities, the Burning Man experience is in a
league of its own and has no real competitors. The annual Rainbow
Family gatherings that take place in national forests on federal land
can be summarized as large but informally organized hippie
shindigs.21 Bohemian Grove, the two-week retreat that the private
Bohemian Club organizes in California’s redwood forest every
summer, has similar aspects like theme camps, effigy burning, and
elaborate art productions. The Bohemian Club, however, with its
shroud of secrecy and male-only membership of prominent figures in
the country’s political, corporate, financial, and artistic sectors, is very
much about exclusion and runs against Burning Man’s principle of
radical inclusion. Burning Man does not turn away anyone who
wishes to participate in the community.22
The ways in which Burning Man is unique will become more
significant in the later discussion of theories on nonprofit formation
and their applicability to Burning Man in Part III.B. First, art
appreciation at Burning Man takes a no-holds-barred approach of
participatory creation and interactive enjoyment; it does away with
the norms of how one should experience art in a traditional museum,
and with the strict division between active production and passive
audience.
Second, unlike packaged travel destinations and
commercial festivals, it seeks spontaneity and participation from
every Burner, not spectatorship.23 Third, Burning Man is unique not
only because there is an organization devoted year-round to all
aspects of its production from planning to clean up, but also because
of the organization’s heavy reliance on volunteer labor to supplement
a small core staff.
Black Rock City, in spite of its for-profit LLC form, is not a
typical company driven by profit and bureaucratic practices. The
Project is committed to decisionmaking by consensus at every level
within the organization.24 Consistent with the principle of radical
inclusion, the management of volunteer labor at Burning Man places
20. Case Statement, BLACK ROCK ARTS FOUNDATION, http://blackrockarts.org/test-anddemo-eli-josie-etc/case-statement (last visited Nov. 10, 2012); Katherine K. Chen & Siobhan
O’Mahony, Differentiating Organizational Boundaries, in 26 Res. Soc. Org. 183, 203 (2009).
21. DOHERTY, supra note 10, at 3–4; DAVID B. SENTELLE, JUDGE DAVE AND THE
RAINBOW PEOPLE 4–5 (2002).
22. Ten Principles of Burning Man, supra note 14.
23. Chen & O’Mahony, supra note 20, at 195–96.
24. AfterBurn Report 2010: Consensus, Hierarchy, Authority and Power, BURNING MAN,
http://afterburn.burningman.com/10/org/consensus.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2012).
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an emphasis on collectivism over efficiency and tries to find the best
fit for everyone who is interested in participating based on his/her
interests, even if this entails experimentation or the creation of new
positions.25
To be clear, consensus decisionmaking is not the same thing as
democracy. Rather, Burning Man can be more aptly described as a
“do-ocracy”: Members contribute to the organization by coming and
doing. Perhaps it would be more appropriate to describe the
decisionmaking process within Burning Man’s organization as
consensus building by default that resorts to top-down hierarchy
when specific issues call for the kind of organizational expertise or
institutional memory that the average participant simply does not
have.26 Consensus does not mean that participants should have a say
in every single decision; while the organizers will listen to all
interested members’ ideas and incorporate them into decisionmaking
processes as appropriate, the organizers have the final say in certain
issues like financial allocation.27
In the annual AfterBurn Report that the organizers have
published online for every Burning Man event since 2001, the
consensus document clarifies that decisionmaking is about creating
agreement among all participants, not about obtaining a majority
vote. For a decision to be adopted, every participant must give his or
her consent, but not everyone has to agree that it is the best decision.
Decisionmaking at Black Rock City does not use voting; votes, which
can be traded, bid on, or leveraged for power, are viewed as the
commoditization of opinions.28
A. REASONS FOR ADOPTING THE CURRENT LLC STRUCTURE
Black Rock City is a LLC registered in the state of Nevada and
comprised of six members holding equal interests.29 These six
individuals serve on the Burning Man Board, the most senior
management entity in the organization.30 Larry Harvey, the Project’s
conceptual engineer, takes the helm as the chairman of the LLC and
25. KATHERINE K. CHEN, ENABLING
THE BURNING MAN EVENT 70–79 (2009).

CREATIVE CHAOS: THE ORGANIZATION BEHIND

26. See id. at 61.
27. Id. at 54–55, 61.
28. AfterBurn Report 2010: Consensus, Hierarchy, Authority and Power, supra note 24.
29. AfterBurn Report 2010: Black Rock City LLC Operating Agreement, BURNING MAN,
http://afterburn.burningman.com/10/org/llc_agreement.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2012); see
Articles of Organization, Black Rock City LLC (on file with author).
30. Burning Man Board, BURNING MAN, http://www.burningman.com/whatisburningman/
organization/board.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2012).
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Burning Man’s Senior Staff. The other five members of the LLC are
Marian Goodell, Michael Michael (also known as Danger Ranger),
Crimson Rose, Will Roger, and Harley Dubois, all of whom have
been integrally involved in Burning Man’s management and
operation since the Project’s early days.31
For a brief period of time, Black Rock City existed as a threeperson legal partnership, a form which subjects the personal assets of
partners to liabilities arising from the event. The 1996 event marked
a turning point: reckless behavior on the part of some individuals, two
tragic accidents, unanticipated population growth, and insufficient
resources made it clear that more formal organization was necessary
if Burning Man were to continue.32 Ensuing internal disagreements as
to the future of Burning Man and the departure of one partner led to
the dissolution of the partnership and the adoption of the current
LLC form in 1997.33
The organizers in 1997 decided to operate as a LLC for several
reasons. Profit making was not one of them. Doing business with
agencies and resource providers like the Bureau of Land
Management and equipment rental companies required the
legitimacy of some kind of legal entity.34 The Bureau of Land
Management and the resource providers did not have preferences for
the specific organizational form that Burning Man adopts, so long as
it had one.35 The LLC form was flexible and easy to implement
compared to alternatives like the nonprofit form which imposes more
onerous requirements.36 For one thing, the nonprofit form would
have necessitated the creation of a disinterested board of directors to
exercise oversight over the management.
As the six LLC owners are key organizers with a deep personal
investment in both running and experiencing Burning Man, it did not
seem right for them to become the hired managers of a nonprofit
entity and cede authority to a disinterested board that makes
decisions without doing the actual work.37 Unlike the prior legal
partnership status that Black Rock City took on briefly, the LLC
31. DOHERTY, supra note 10, at 123; see Burning Man Board, supra note 30.
32. See CHEN, supra note 25, at 30–31, 45.
33. Id. at 31, 46.
34. Id. at 46; Telephone Interview with Marian Goodell, Dir. of Bus. & Commc’ns, Black
Rock City LLC (Mar. 29, 2011).
35. Telephone Interview with Marian Goodell, supra note 34.
36. Id. See generally Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 82.006–82.546 (1999), available at http://www.leg.
state.nv.us/NRS/nrs-082.html; CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTO, NEVADA DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, A GUIDE TO NON-PROFITS, available at
http://ag.state.nv.us/publications/manuals/Guide%20to%20NonProfits.pdf.
37. DOHERTY, supra note 10, at 122–23; AfterBurn Report 2010: Financial Structure,
BURNING MAN, http://afterburn.burningman.com/10/org/financial_structure.html (last visited
Nov. 10, 2012).
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form also protects the owners’ personal assets from liability arising
from the event. Protection against liability, however, was more of a
fringe benefit for adopting the LLC form; after all, the organizers did
not have much in the way of personal assets back in 1997.38
Jokingly referred to as a “no-profit” by Larry Harvey, Black
Rock City is not a traditional LLC. In line with its opposition to
commercialism, the organization does not accept investors or
commercial sponsors. The actual event operates under a gift
economy and forbids all forms of vending except for ice and coffee
sales.39 Though the event is not free and is funded primarily by ticket
sales both at the gate and leading up to the event, the organization
behind Burning Man is an ideological one, committed to values and
goals that are not driven by, and sometimes completely at odds with,
profit making. This is a group of people who do not seem to care
much about profit or efficiency, but feel compelled to run Burning
Man as a business in order to ensure the Project’s continuation. It
does not take an efficient bottom-line approach and embraces
collectivist practices like consensus decisionmaking; its volunteer
placement process is more keen on tailoring to the individual’s
interests rather than ensuring the efficient allocation of resources.40
Members of the Burning Man community care about Black Rock
City’s organizational form because their experiences are affected by
the Project’s behind-the-scenes consistency with its purported
principles. Choosing the right organizational form is an important
task for any institution. For an organization such as Burning Man
that is ideologically committed to inclusion, consensus
decisionmaking, and active participation from all community
members, its choice of organization form takes on imperative
significance. In a recent phone conversation, Marian Goodell
recollected how when people found out that Burning Man was being
run by a LLC, they were often surprised or disappointed.41 What lies
at the core of these reactions seems to be a visceral distrust of a
38. Telephone Interview with Marian Goodell, supra note 34.
39. AfterBurn Report 2010: Financial Structure, supra note 37. Coffee sales break even,
and profits from ice sales are donated to local charity and community groups. Telephone
Interview with Marian Goodell, supra note 34. For a list of charitable donation recipients of ice
sale profits from 2010, see Andie Grace, Burning Man’s Charitable Donations for 2010, THE
BURNING BLOG (Dec. 20, 2010), http://blog.burningman.com/news/burning-mans-charitabledonations-for-2010.
40. CHEN, supra note 25, at 52–53. Black Rock City LLC takes a collectivist approach in its
volunteer management practices where inclusion trumps efficiency. New projects and
responsibilities proposed by individuals are given a chance to prove themselves even if they are
not viewed as efficient allocations of resources. Volunteer coordinators also accept and train
more volunteers than necessary for a given job because they expect there to be no-shows when
the time comes to get the job done. Id. at 75–77.
41. Telephone Interview with Marian Goodell, supra note 34.

JI (DO NOT DELETE)

460

3/31/2013 11:33 PM

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 9:3

LLC’s ability to stay true to Burning Man’s altruistic vision of
community, and the belief that the nonprofit form is the best
structure for the provision of public goods. Because a significant part
of Burning Man’s appeal is that its gift economy creates among
strangers an environment that we normally reserve for intimates, and
because participants who are not satisfied with how the Project is run
can exit with ease, picking the organizational form that credibly
signals its commitment to altruism is vital to Burning Man’s long-term
survival.42
The organizers’ decision to adopt the for-profit LLC form is not
an intuitive one given Burning Man’s reliance on volunteer labor,
antimarket spirit, and deliberate destruction of accumulated wealth.
The Project’s for-profit form has been attacked as a medium for
profit maximization through the exploitation of volunteer labor.
Dedicated members have raised concerns that formal organization
gives rise to hierarchical decisionmaking, micromanagement, and lack
of empowerment to senior volunteers, all of which prioritize
bureaucracy over participant input and dehumanize the whole
process.43
Indeed, organizers had considered forming as a nonprofit in the
past, and critics within the organization have called for restructuring
as a nonprofit because it would provide more organizational
credibility and accountability to the community than a for-profit form
would.44 Many people recognized that due to its sheer size, Burning
Man requires some kind of formal organization and the financial
means of maintaining a year-round staff, but with a large volunteer
labor force and ticket prices growing every year, even those who do
not demand the Project’s conversion to nonprofit status have
questioned the organization’s lack of financial transparency.45
Organizers have been receptive to these concerns by improving
organizational accountability in several ways. Selective disclosures of
financial expenses like Larry Harvey’s salary have been published in
newsletters starting in 1993.46
Black Rock Arts Foundation
(“BRAF”), the LLC’s nonprofit branch dedicated to the gathering
and distribution of grants to fund art projects, was added in 2001.
Starting with the 2001 Burn and for every year since, the annual

42. See infra Part III.B.3.
43. See CHEN, supra note 25, at 48.
44. See CHEN, supra note 25, at 48–49; AfterBurn Report 2010: Financial Structure, supra
note 37.
45. CHEN, supra note 25, at 49–50.
46. Id. at 52–53.
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companion AfterBurn Report available online has included a
financial report of itemized expenses for running the event.47
To protect the Project’s property from commercialization, Black
Rock City LLC’s operating agreement has incorporated a nontransferability provision: No member of the LLC can transfer his or
her interest in the organization’s property in the event of death or
departure from the partnership. The organizers feel strongly that no
member’s share of the organization should be alienable and open to
the possibility of sale or transfer like a commodity in the market
place.48 Nevada law, however, treats each member’s interest in a LLC
as transferrable personal property, which can be sold to or traded
with any recipient.49 Upon resignation or withdrawal, a member is
entitled to the fair market value of his or her share unless the LLC’s
articles of organization or operating agreement specifies otherwise.50
The organizers added the non-transferability provision to the
operating agreement to address their unease with this characteristic
of the LLC form. Members of the LLC who leave the Project “will
receive, as sole compensation for many years of service, a golden
parachute of $20,000. Their share will then revert back to the
group.”51 Assets belonging to the Burning Man organization are not
for sale—they will always belong to the community rather than to any
single individual.
B. CONVERSION TO A NONPROFIT ENTITY
The timing of this Article is rather uncanny. After I decided to
pursue the topic of organizational form choice, I learned that Burning
Man is in the process of converting from the current LLC to a
nonprofit structure.52 The full transition is estimated to take place in
the next three to five years.53 As of the date of publication, exactly
when and how this transition will take place is still under discussion
and has not yet been determined.54
47. See, e.g., AfterBurn Report 2009: Financial Chart, BURNING MAN, http://afterburn.
burningman.com/09/financial_chart.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2012).
48. AfterBurn Report 2010: Financial Structure, supra note 37.
49. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 86.351(1) (1999), available at www.leg.state.nv.us/nrs/ NRS-086.
html#NRS086Sec091.
50. Id.
51. AfterBurn Report 2010: Financial Structure, supra note 37.
52. See John Curley, The State of the Man, THE BURNING BLOG (Sept. 1, 2010),
http://blog.burningman.com/eventshappenings/the-state-of-the-man.
53. Telephone Interview with Marian Goodell, supra note 34.
54. E-mail from Brooke Oliver, Legal Counsel, Black Rock City LLC, to Yuan Ji (Nov. 20,
2012, 16:43 EDT) (on file with author).
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III. ALTERNATIVE ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS
The Burning Man community’s opinions on what is the best
organizational form for the Project are undoubtedly important, and
the organizers’ receptiveness to the participants’ feedback in the
decision to convert to a nonprofit is commendable. However, it is not
obvious that the nonprofit is an inherently better form for the
provision of public goods, assuming that Burning Man provides a
public good.
This Part will first offer a literature review on the various ways in
which a business’s choice of organizational form can affect
institutional behavior. It will then analyze three organizational
structure alternatives for the facilitation of altruism: The nonprofit,
the LLC, and the hybrid. Part III.B applies to Burning Man four
theories on nonprofit formation to show that the need for credible
signaling of altruism and access to public subsidies are the best
rationales for the Project’s transition to a nonprofit structure. These
rationales, however, do not negate the fact that altruistic
organizations can succeed in a for-profit form. Part III.C outlines the
LLC form’s history to highlight its flexibility and advantages for
closely held corporations. Part III.D points to the recent rise of
hybrid for-profit/nonprofit forms like the L3C and the B Corporation
in various states, which are still in their infancy for adequate
evaluation but may prove to be good options for the Burning Man
organization in the future.
A. HOW THE CHOICE OF ORGANIZATIONAL FORM AFFECTS
INSTITUTIONAL BEHAVIOR
The best organizational form for an organization will vary
depending on the interaction between a particular form’s influence on
institutional behavior and its mission, which can be but is not
necessarily the maximization of profits. This Part, through a review
of literature, illustrates the three ways in which organizational form
can influence institutional behavior: incentives for administrators and
employees, consumers’ patronage based on their perceptions of the
organization, and differences in regulatory treatment.55 Criteria for
evaluating an organizational form’s effectiveness are also suggested
55. See Mark Schlesinger, Mismeasuring the Consequences of Ownership: External
Influences and the Comparative Performance of Public, For-Profit, and Private Nonprofit
Organizations, in PRIVATE ACTION AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 85, 87–88 (Walter W. Powell &
Elisabeth S. Clemens eds., 1998).
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for the discussion of alternative forms in Part III.
Incentives to administrators and employees affect an institution’s
productivity and competitive advantage against competitors, which
determine its long-term survival. As bound by the laws of the state in
which it is formed, every nonprofit is subject to the nondistribution
constraint that prohibits the distribution of profits to its officers,
directors, members, or trustees.56 Because of restrictions on financial
compensation like the lack of stock options, nonprofits tend to shift
toward nonfinancial “perks” to reward their employees. Changing
patterns of compensation to employees can contribute to differences
in organization performance.57
Consumers base their perceptions of an organization’s
trustworthiness on its choice of organizational form when there is
informational asymmetry between the consumers and the
organization. Informational asymmetry arises when the services
provided by an organization are sufficiently complex that the
consumers cannot directly monitor the delivery or assess the quality
of the products they have purchased.58 Examples of such services
include donation-financed charities, day care providers, and financial
intermediaries. For consumers who worry that the providers may
exploit informational asymmetry by offering products of inferior
quality or quantity and pocketing the savings for private gains, the
nonprofit form can serve as a signal of trustworthiness for two
reasons. First, the nonprofit form’s nondistribution constraint serves
as a check against abuse by managers seeking personal gains.59
Second, nonprofits that pursue organizational goals other than profit
maximization appear more trustworthy if they espouse nonfinancial
values that are at odds with consumer exploitation.60 Part III.B.3 will
discuss why the signaling of trustworthiness, while undoubtedly
important for any business, is crucial to Burning Man’s continued
existence.

56. Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, in THE ECONOMICS OF
NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS: STUDIES IN STRUCTURE AND POLICY 57, 58 (Susan RoseAckerman ed., 1986) [hereinafter Hansmann III].
57. Schlesinger, supra note 55, at 87; see Laura Leete, Work in the Nonprofit Sector, in The
Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook 159, 163 (Walter W. Powell ed., 2006) (noting that in
the 1990s, the rapid rise and the shift toward performance-based packages in for-profit
executive compensation are factors driving the public discourse on how compensation practices
in the nonprofit sector should diverge from their for-profit counterparts).
58. See Burton A. Weisbrod, Institutional Form and Organizational Behavior, in PRIVATE
ACTION AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 69, 74 (Walter W. Powell & Elisabeth S. Clemens eds. 1998)
[hereinafter Weisbrod I].
59. Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 862–83
(1980) [hereinafter Hansmann IV].
60. Schlesinger, supra note 55, at 87.
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The third way in which organizational form can influence
institutional behavior is differential treatment by regulators. Most
nonprofits, for example, are exempt from property, sales, and
corporate income taxation. For industries in which nonprofits
compete against for-profit firms, this preferential tax treatment has
been shown to increase the market share of nonprofits relative to
their for-profit competitors.61 Other preferential treatments available
to most nonprofits include reduced postal rates, the ability to issue
tax-exempt bonds and, for nonprofits that have acquired 501(c)(3)
exempt status, different criteria and payment options for satisfying
their liabilities under unemployment insurance laws.62
Criteria used to evaluate institutional behavior include, but are
not limited to, efficiency, output quality, consumer informational
deficiencies, and output rationing methods.63 In measuring efficiency
and output quality, it cannot be assumed that identical outputs can be
produced regardless of organizational form. For example, the
nonprofit form can more credibly produce outputs that stay true to
the organization’s social values and are not driven by profit; products
with these traits are different from, but hard to measure in tangible
ways relative to, their for-profit counterparts, which might in turn bias
valuations of the nonprofit form’s comparative efficiency.64 On the
input end, Henry Hansmann has argued that, at least in industries in
which nonprofits are likely to serve consumers better than for-profit
firms would, the corporate income tax exemption for nonprofits is
justified because it compensates nonprofits for the constraints they
face in accessing the capital market.65
B. NONPROFITS AND WHY THEY FORM
It is to the benefit of any institution’s customers and intended
beneficiaries to understand the alternative organizational forms
available, given the corresponding differences in institutional
behavior that are expected to arise. Several theories have been
advanced to explain the existence of nonprofits. This Part will discuss
the following four theories and evaluate their applicability to Burning
Man: the public good theory, the contract failure theory, credible
61. See Henry B. Hansmann, The Effect of Tax Exemption and Other Factors on the
Market Share of Nonprofit Versus For Profit Firms, 40 NAT’L TAX J. 71, 71 (1987) [hereinafter
Hansmann V].
62. See id.
63. Weisbrod I, supra note 58, at 69, 74–75.
64. See id. at 74.
65. See Hansmann II, supra note 2, at 55.
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signaling of altruism, and subsidy theory. The purpose of this
discussion is to give an analytical rationale to the visceral discomfort
shared by many upon finding out that Burning Man is operated as a
LLC and not as a nonprofit. The key takeaway is this: The credible
signaling of altruistic commitment combined with favorable
treatments like tax exemption and grant availability provide the best
reasons for Burning Man’s conversion to the nonprofit form. These
pro-conversion reasons, however, do not rule out the possibility that
Burning Man’s mission can thrive in its current LLC form.
The consumer control theory for why nonprofits form should be
acknowledged, albeit briefly: Patrons of an exclusive social club, even
if they are in the position to judge the quality of services accurately,
want to run the club as a nonprofit as a way to exert control over the
organization and to prevent monopolistic membership fee pricing by
the organization’s owners.66 However, the consumer control theory is
not particularly applicable to the case study of Burning Man. The
Project is far from an exclusive social club to begin with, and given
the sheer number of participants, consumer ownership is neither
feasible nor contemplated for Burning Man’s current conversion to
the nonprofit form.
A nonprofit organization’s essential characteristic is the
prohibition on profit distribution to individuals who exercise control,
such as officers, directors, members, or trustees. Professor Henry
Hansmann has coined a term for this characteristic: the
nondistribution constraint.67 Most nonprofits are incorporated, but
some are unincorporated organizations. Given the relative ease of
incorporation and the lack of statutory or case law on unincorporated
organizations, the unincorporated nonprofit form is uncommon in the
United States.68
Nonprofit organizations can be classified by their sources of
income and structures of control. Nonprofits that derive most of their
incomes from donations are referred to as donative nonprofits, while
those that derive most of their incomes from sales of goods or services
are commercial nonprofits. A nonprofit is mutual if the ultimate
control of the organization, as manifested in the power to elect the
board of directors, is held by its patrons. Nonprofits that are not
mutual, especially if they have self-perpetuating boards of directors,
are referred to as entrepreneurial nonprofits.69 However, many
66. Hansmann I, supra note 2, at 33; see Avner Ben-Ner, Nonprofit Organizations: Why Do
They Exist in Market Economies?, in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS: STUDIES
IN STRUCTURE AND POLICY 94 (Susan

Rose-Ackerman ed., 1986).
67. Hansmann IV, supra note 59, at 838.
68. Hansmann III, supra note 56, at 59.
69. Hansmann I, supra note 2, at 28.
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nonprofits straddle the lines between these categories. Burning Man
would be labeled as both donative and commercial in the sense that
its operation relies heavily on both donations of volunteer labor and
ticket sales. Assuming that participants do not have any input in the
election of board directors once Burning Man completes its LLC-tononprofit conversion, it would be an entrepreneurial nonprofit.

1. The Public Good Theory and Quasi-Public Goods
As first proposed by Professor Burton Weisbrod, dissatisfaction
with the low level of quantity or quality of a public good70 that caters
to median tastes and heterogeneity in consumers’ tastes gives rise to
nonprofits.71 In other words, nonprofits are private solutions to
supplement the public sector by satisfying the residual unsatisfied
demand of consumers whose tastes deviate from the median.72 While
it is true that many services with public good characteristics are
provided by nonprofits, the public good theory raises two questions:
(1) why do many nonprofits provide private goods rather than public
goods?, and (2) why do nonprofits rather than for-profits arise to
meet the residual unsatisfied demand of consumers with off-themainstream tastes?73
The experience that Burning Man offers to participants fits
within the public good theory but is not a pure public good. It is more
like an excludable quasi-public good: A nonrivalrous good capable of
excluding nonpayers.74 If conventional art museums and state parks
can be analogized to public goods catering to the median taste, then
Burning Man certainly satisfies off-the-mainstream demand with
offerings like interactive art and camping in a decommoditized
temporary city. However, participation at Burning Man is not a pure
public good because it is excludable in the economic sense: Those
who have not purchased tickets beforehand simply cannot enter the
premises.
It is the general consensus that the private market is the best
provider of private goods and that public goods are best provided by
the public sector. With quasi-public goods like Burning Man,
70. A public good has two characteristics: nonrivalrous and nonexcludable. A good is nonrivalrous if it does not cost more to provide the good to many people than it does to provide the
good to one person, and nonexcludable if it is difficult to prevent others from consumption once
the good has been given to one person.
See HELMUT K. ANHEIER, NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS: THEORY, MANAGEMENT, POLICY 118 (2005).
71. See generally BURTON WEISBROD, THE VOLUNTARY NONPROFIT SECTOR (1977).
72. Hansmann I, supra note 2, at 28–29; see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Altruism, Nonprofits,
and Economic Theory, 34 J. ECON. LIT. 701, 716 (1996) (suggesting that “nonprofits may
provide a more diverse collection of services than is possible in the public sector”).
73. Hansmann I, supra note 2, at 29.
74. See ANHEIER, supra note 70, at 118.
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however, the boundaries are not so clear. Quasi-public goods such as
healthcare and social services can be provided by a variety of
organizations like governmental agencies and businesses as well as
nonprofits. For providers of quasi-public goods like Burning Man,
whether the nonprofit form is a better institutional choice than a forprofit alternative requires an analysis of the organization’s supply and
demand conditions.75 The following theories on nonprofit formation
contribute to this analysis by supplementing rather than competing
with the public good theory.

2. The Contract Failure Theory
Hansmann has proposed a different theory on why nonprofits
arise: In situations where consumer cannot accurately judge the
quality or quantity of services, they prefer to support nonprofits
because the nondistribution constraint serves as a check against the
management’s incentive to skimp on quality for personal gains.76 In
other words, nonprofits arise as solutions to market failures in which
consumers are unable to monitor producers through ordinary
contractual arrangements. Hansmann calls this type of market failure
“contract failures.”77 The contract failure theory is more relevant for
donative nonprofits than commercial nonprofits, because donors
often have no contact with the intended beneficiaries and therefore
have no way to assess the quality of services provided.78 For this
reason, donors are often more willing to donate to nonprofit
organizations because they feel that nonprofit management is less
likely to misuse the organization’s resources for private gains.79 This
is why most private donations are made to nonprofit organizations,
not to for-profits or government entities.80
75. See ANHEIER, supra note 70, at 119.
76. Hansmann IV, supra note 59, at 844–45.
77. Id. The contract failure theory is rooted in the theme that nonprofits form in response
to informational asymmetry faced by consumers. This theme had been visited in earlier works
and laid the foundation for Hansmann’s contract failure theory. See generally Richard Nelson
& Michael Krashinsky, Two Major Issues of Public Policy: Public Policy and Organization of
Supply, in PUBLIC SUBSIDY FOR DAY CARE OF YOUNG CHILDREN (1973) (suggesting that the
prevalence of nonprofit daycare centers can be attributed to the difficulty parents have in
judging a daycare center’s quality of service, and the fear that for-profit daycares are more likely
to provide inferior services); Kenneth Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of
Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941 (1963) (suggesting that information asymmetry between
patient and healthcare providers contributes to the formation of nonprofit hospitals).
78. Hansmann I, supra note 2, at 30–31.
79. But cf. Anup Malani & Guy David, Does Nonprofit Status Signal Quality?, 37 J. LEGAL
STUD. 551 (2008) (using evidence from a survey based on over 2800 firms in the hospital,
nursing home, or child care industries to show there is no support for the hypothesis that
nonprofit status signals quality).
80. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2, at 716.
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However, the contract failure theory alone is not a convincing
rationale for Burning Man’s conversion to nonprofit status.
Consumers are able to overcome informational asymmetry if they can
directly judge the quality of an organization’s services or participate
in the organization’s management.81 Burners do this by living and
working in Black Rock City: They apply for art grants from BRAF,
volunteer their labor to the Project’s management and operation, and
influence the organization through consensus decision making.
Burning Man’s participants, of course, do not have perfect
information and control over the Project’s operation. Making
decisions on certain issues is simply not feasible on a consensus
model, and senior organizers have the final say over decisions in areas
like financial allocation. Admittedly, participants cannot judge
whether the Burning Man organization is taking advantage of
volunteers and participants when it has the financial capacity for paid
labor and lower ticket prices instead.
This in no way implies that the Project in its current for-profit
LLC form exploits volunteer labor, but simply highlights areas in
which greater
financial transparency and organizational
accountability would make an improvement. For example, if the
publicly available AfterBurn Reports include full financial disclosures
combined with an explanation about the allocation of profits (if any)
resulting from each event, the contract failure theory would be much
less relevant.82
But given that Burning Man can take such
straightforward measures to improve financial transparency and
organizational accountability while staying as a LLC, the contract
failure theory on its own is not a compelling rationale for the Project’s
conversion to a nonprofit.

3. Credible Signaling of Altruism
This Part explains why the credible signaling of altruism, which is
crucial for an organization that relies heavily on gift exchange as the
mode for both participation and volunteer labor recruitment,
provides a more persuasive reason for Burning Man’s LLC-tononprofit conversion. Such signaling of credibility is imperative for
two reasons. First, the Project seeks to create among strangers a
81. See id.; Ben-Ner, supra note 66, at 109–10 (suggesting that informational asymmetry can
be overcome if consumers take control of a nonprofit firm through demand revelation,
participation in the determination of the organization’s goals, and monitoring the organization’s
performance).
82. The AfterBurn Reports do publish financial statements, but they are partial disclosures
of expenditures without revenues. See, e.g., AfterBurn Report 2009: Financial Chart, supra
note 47. To the Project organizers’ credit, the public disclosure of finances is not required by
Nevada’s LLC statute, so the fact that the AfterBurn Reports offer financial statements at all
shows the organizers’ receptiveness to greater financial transparency.
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sense of trust and intimacy ordinarily reserved for intimate
relationships.
Second, when compared to more permanent
arrangements like the household, Burning Man is a fleeting
experience in which participants can exit with relative ease. The
combination of these two factors puts the Burning Man organization
under greater pressure to secure the participants’ trust, eliminate any
suspicion of impropriety, and operate in the legal form that is most
consistent with its mission.
Professor Susan Rose-Ackerman has posited that the nonprofit
form is favored by both altruistic consumers and ideological
entrepreneurs.83 Individuals wanting outlets for their generosity see
the nonprofit form as a partial guarantee that their donations will not
be misappropriated as profits, and ideologues driven by ideas rather
than profit maximization see the nonprofit as a better form because it
does not have to appease profit-driven investors.84 It is true that a
for-profit form can do away with investors as well, but holding all else
equal, the theory goes, an organization would still prefer the
nonprofit form because of its tax and regulatory benefits.85
The nonprofit form does not necessarily advance altruistic
purposes better than for-profit forms can; it does, however, signal an
organization’s commitment to altruism with more credibility.
Consumers are willing to patronize nonprofit organizations run by
ideologues because they have two potential advantages over forprofit competitors: quality control and product differentiation. The
quality control advantage arises from the assumption that an altruistic
organization in the nonprofit form is more likely to attract employees
sharing the same values, and such employees require less monitoring
and inspire greater confidence in consumers for the quality of the
final product. The nonprofit form is a signal to committed employees
that their efforts are advancing altruistic goals rather than enriching
investors. Some high level employees like hospital executives and
lawyers have been shown to forgo higher pay in exchange for greater
confidence that their works are advancing altruistic goals.86 The
See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2, at 723–24.
Id.
Id. at 719.
Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2, at 719–20. See generally Anne Preston, The Nonprofit
Worker in a For-Profit World, 7 J. LAB. ECON. 438 (1989) (suggesting that white-collar workers
83.
84.
85.
86.

decide to work at nonprofits for lower pay in exchange for the opportunity to produce goods
with positive social externalities); Myron J. Roomkin & Burton A. Weisbrod, Managerial
Compensation and Incentives in For-Profit and Nonprofit Hospitals, 15 J. L. ECON. ORG. 750
(1999) (suggesting that nonprofits and for-profits may attract different types of top-level
managers, both because nonprofits prefer managers who share their goals and because some
managers prefer working at nonprofits even if at lower pay); Burton Weisbrod, Nonprofit and
Proprietary Sector Behavior: Wage Differentials Among Lawyers, 1 J. LAB. ECON. 246 (1983)
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product differentiation advantage arises when consumers with lessthan-well-formed tastes in, say, education or the arts, prefer to
support ideologues with strong views, because the ideologues’
professed disregard for profit maximization is a signal of the product’s
quality and commitment to certain values.87 When compared to the
public good and contract failure theories, credible altruism proves to
be a more persuasive rationale for Burning Man’s conversion to
nonprofit status.88
A significant part of Burning Man’s appeal is that the sense of
community, mutual reliance, and trust it creates among strangers is
rarely found outside intimate relationships. Interactions among
strangers are often governed by contracts and monetized market
transactions, while those among intimates like family and friends
default more to gift exchanges. Among trusting intimates who are
confident that spontaneous reciprocity will make everyone better off
in the long run, a gift economy avoids the transaction costs entailed
by negotiation and enforcement of trade terms. Spontaneous gift
exchange is also in line with our socialized aversion to cash
transactions among intimates, and creates a sense of reciprocityinduced satisfaction that exists independent of instrumental
advantages.89 The suspicion that Burning Man’s for-profit form can
be used to the organizers’ private gains can severely undermine the
community’s faith in the gift economy, and ultimately undermine the
Project’s legitimacy itself.
Especially when Burners can easily exit the organization by
choosing not to return next year or to leave at any point during the
event, the credibility of Burning Man’s organizational form can
conceivably make or break its long-term survival.
Unlike
organizations that produce private goods, public good providers may
(suggesting that public interest lawyers have different preferences from their counterparts in the
private sector and are willing to accept substantially lower pay as a result).
87. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2, at 720–21.
88. See Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501, 510
(1990) (arguing that altruism gives rise to nonprofits even in markets that under the orthodox
theory would be more efficiently supplied by for-profits; and that these nonprofits’ altruistic
supply of goods and services, by virtue of being distinct from the regular market supply, is a
rationale for the federal tax exemption of nonprofits); see also Susan Rose-Ackerman,

Altruistic Nonprofit Firms in Competitive Markets: The Case of Day-care Centers in the United
States, 9 J. CONSUMER POL. 291 (1986) (arguing that altruistic nonprofit daycare providers offer
higher quality at lower prices, but the demand for these nonprofits outruns supply, thereby
forcing parents to go with for-profit day care providers instead).
89. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, THE HOUSEHOLD: INFORMAL ORDER AROUND THE HEARTH
104–06 (2008); see Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1937
(1987) (advocating that market-inalienable things, which can be given away but not sold, should
be evaluated on the basis of personhood and human flourishing rather than traditional
liberalism or economics).
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have committed members who continue to care about the quality of
the organization’s output even after they have left the organization.
Such members would therefore seek to improve the organization
whether from within or without; they would, for example, exit the
organization to catalyze a radical but necessary change in the
organization’s operation.90

4. Subsidy Theories
Another plausible explanation for the proliferation of nonprofits
is that they receive a variety of subsidies, including but not limited to
special treatments like tax exemption, charitable deductions for
donors, financing through tax-exempt bonds, and grants. Subsidy
theories suggest that nonprofits form to take advantage of these
subsidies, especially in industries with for-profit competitors.91 If this
is true, then to evaluate whether an altruistic organization should
operate as a nonprofit from a public policy perspective, it is
worthwhile to ask why nonprofits are entitled to subsidies in the first
place. Professor Henry Hansmann has proposed that tax exemption
for nonprofits is a subsidy justified on efficiency grounds due to the
greater difficulty that nonprofits encounter in raising capital.92 This is
not as relevant for Burning Man because the Project is currently
completely funded by ticket sales and has little need for other forms
of capital.93
For tax purposes, the policy rationale underlying the favorable
treatment of nonprofits appears to not just be an explicit intent to
subsidize nonprofits, but also an attempt to properly define the tax
base.94 The latter base-defining rationale is illustrated by the fact that
the federal tax budget does not treat nonprofit tax exemptions as tax
expenditures. The idea is that the tax exemptions enjoyed by
qualifying nonprofit organizations do not count as tax subsidies
because the incomes derived by these organizations fall outside of the
normal income tax base, and therefore should not be taxable in the
first place.95
In other words, income tax exemption is not a special privilege
90. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 98–105 (1970).
91. Hansmann I, supra note 2, at 33; see Hansmann V, supra note 61, at 71 (using state tax
data to show that tax exemption increases the market share of nonprofits relative to their forprofit competitors).
92. See generally Hansmann II, supra note 2.
93. See Telephone Interview with Marian Goodell, supra note 34.
94. Evelyn Brody & Joseph J. Cordes, Tax Treatment of Nonprofit Organizations: A TwoEdged Sword?, in NONPROFITS & GOVERNMENT: COLLABORATION & CONFLICT 141, 152–55
(Elizabeth T. Boris & C. Eugene Steuerle eds., 2d. ed. 2006).
95. Id. at 153.
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for nonprofits with public service missions; rather, they are exempt
because they do not generate income in the sense that for-profit
businesses do for their investors’ benefit. Even if the concept of
“income” is to deviate from the ordinary sense of the word and
defined to include the financial activities of public service nonprofits,
the tax burden would not accurately reflect the individual
beneficiaries’ abilities to pay.96 In the case of Burning Man, this basedefining rationale takes on a particular sense of poetic justice: In the
niche of decommoditization that Burning Man has deliberately
carved out from our market-based economy, it does not seem right
that the ticket revenues necessary to its survival are taxed like the
ordinary transactions of a profit-driven corporation.
Public subsidies for the performing arts often take the form of
grants in the United States. Most of these grants come in the form of
matching grants conditional on private donations. Hansmann has
justified grant subsidies for the performing arts on efficiency
grounds.97 His theory is that given the high fixed costs and low
marginal costs of putting on a production as well as the relatively
small demand, nonprofit organizations in the performing arts survive
by charging high prices to patrons with the most inelastic demands.
This is essentially a form of voluntary price discrimination in which
patrons with the most exacting standards for quality and good seats
pay the highest prices. For cases in which the opportunities for price
discrimination through ticketing are limited and the cost of
production exceeds donations, public subsidies in the form of grants
are justified because making the production possible would be an
efficient outcome.98 This is a conceivable scenario once Burning Man
becomes a nonprofit, but does not imply that the LLC is an
inappropriate organizational form for the Project’s mission. Despite
the high costs required to make Burning Man happen, the Project
seems to have managed just fine without grant subsidies and even
turned a modest profit for the past three years.99

96. Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from
Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 305, 358 (1976).
97. Henry B. Hansmann, Nonprofit Enterprise in the Performing Arts, 12 BELL J. ECON.

341, 360 (1981) [hereinafter Hansmann VI].
98. Hansmann VI, supra note 97, at 360.
99. See Telephone Interview with Marian Goodell, supra note 34; E-mail from Marian
Goodell, Dir. of Bus. & Commc’ns, Black Rock Ciy LLC, to Yuan Ji, Yale Law School (Apr. 8,
2011, 01:17 EDT) (on file with author).
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C. LIMITED LIABILITY CORPORATIONS
To fully appreciate the flexibility and benefits of the LLC form, it
is helpful to briefly review the legal forms available to a closely held
corporation like Black Rock City before the LLC became an option.
A business is defined as closely held if its shares are typically owned
by a few shareholders and not traded on an exchange.100 A closely
held business can take the form of a LLC, partnership, corporation,
or sole proprietorship.101 Prior to 1988, closely held businesses only
had two options: Partnership or corporation. The partnership form is
the default form for closely held firms with a few owners. It enjoys
single-level taxation at the owner level under Subchapter K of the
Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”), but subjects the owners’ personal
assets to unlimited liability102 and allows each partner to dissolve the
partnership at will.103 The corporation form, designed for businesses
with many owners and liquid interests, is relatively unsuited for
closely held firms. It enjoys limited liability but is subject to double
taxation at both the corporate and the owner level under Subchapter
C of the IRC.104 Unlike a partnership, a corporation can only be
dissolved by majority shareholder and director vote.105
The choice between the partnership and corporation forms has
several tradeoffs for closely held businesses. The default rules of both
forms are such that choosing the partnership form is a tradeoff
between the shareholders’ direct management control and ownership
liquidity. Each partner has equal rights in the management and
conduct of the business; however, a partner’s share of ownership
cannot be transferred without the prior consent of other owners.106 In
100. Bennedsen & Wolfenzon, The Balance of Power in Closely Held Corporations, 58 J.
FIN. ECON. 113, 113–14 (2000).
101. RAY D. MADOFF ET AL., PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ESTATE PLANNING: § 11.02 (CCH,
2009).
102. Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Choice of Form and Network Externalities,
43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 79, 83–84 (2001). The restriction of a business’s creditors’ recovery to
only business assets and not to the owners’ nonbusiness personal assets is commonly referred to
as “limited liability.” The partnership form’s unlimited liability is not ideal for business owners
since most of them can be expected to prefer limited liability. Id. at 83.
103. See, e.g., Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 87.310(1)(b) & 87.310(2) (1999) (stating conditions under
which a partnership can be dissolved “by the express will of any partner”).
104. A corporation is subject to double-taxation by default unless it qualifies and choose to
incorporate as a S corporation under Subchapter S of the IRC. A S corporation functions like a
partnership for federal taxation purposes in the sense that it passes corporate income, income,
losses, deductions, and credit to the shareholders’ personal tax returns at their respective
individual income tax rates. See S Corporations, IRS (Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.irs.gov/
businesses/small/Note/0,,id=98263,00.html; Ribstein & Kobayashi, Choice of Form and Network
Externalities, supra note 103, at 84.
105. See, e.g., Nev. Rev. Stat. § 78.575.
106. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 401 (f), (i) (1997). Section 401 of the 1997 Uniform Partnership Act
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contrast, corporate shareholders have little direct management
authority but can easily exit by selling their shares. Relatively
speaking, the partnership form’s default rules are better suited for
closely held businesses because it is often the case that an
organization with a few owners would prefer direct management
control, enjoy the lack of double taxation, and not care too much
about the ease of ownership transferability. However, choosing the
partnership form comes with two undesirable features: unlimited
liability and dissolution at the will of a single partner.
In 1988, the IRS approved for the first time partnership tax
treatment for a Wyoming LLC because the LLC did not possess a
majority of the four legal characteristics of a corporation for federal
taxation purposes.107 The significance was that a LLC could now
enjoy limited liability without double taxation, and a flurry of LLC
statutes, LLC formations, and laws recognizing foreign LLCs
followed in other states in the early 1990s.108 The Limited Liability
Partnership (“LLP”), a form similar to the LLC, began developing
shortly afterward and was recognized in almost all states by 1998.109
The federal income taxation treatments of LLPs and LLCs are
roughly identical. The most significant difference between the two
forms is that LLP laws are part of state partnership laws, thereby
linking LLPs to the existing network of partnership law and
practice.110 This article will not focus on the LLP form for two
reasons: (1) the rationales driving Burning Man’s current conversion
to a nonprofit form make any discussion of alternative for-profit
forms like the LLP moot to some extent, and (2) the LLC appears to
be a superior alternative to the LLP in most states.111
defines many of the default rules for partnerships, but partners can always deviate from the
default by making contrary agreements as provided by Section 103. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT,
Comment to § 401.
107. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360. The Ninth Circuit held in United States v. Kintner,
216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954) that an association of doctors, by virtue of possessing more
corporate than partnership-like attributes, should be taxed like a corporation despite its
organization as a partnership under state law. In response, the Commissioner of the IRS
enacted the Kintner regulations to limit the scope of corporate tax treatment by defining the
four essential characteristics of a corporation: continuity of life, free transferability of interest,
limited liability, and centralized management. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(2) (1996).
108. Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 103, at 86; Larry Ribstein, The Emergence of the
Limited Liability Company, 51 BUS. LAW. 1, 4, 34 (1995).
109. ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN ON LIMITED
LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS AND THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 1.01 (2000).
110. Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 103, at 87.
111. See, e.g., id. at 121–23 (using state data to show that except in states that significantly
disadvantage the LLC form in tax treatment or by complex statutes, most firms prefer the LLC
form to the LLP. This implies that the benefits of an organization form’s default rules, rather
than network externalities such as that arising from the LLP form’s linkage to existing networks
of state partnership law, drive a business’s choice of organizational form.).
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D. HYBRID FOR-PROFIT/NONPROFIT FORMS
The nonprofit and the LLC are not the only legal forms available
to Burning Man. Within the past few years, many states have started
experimenting with the low-profit LLC (“L3C”), a hybrid forprofit/nonprofit legal form that combines the LLC’s flexibility with
the nonprofit’s socially beneficial objective. To qualify as a L3C, a
company must further one of the charitable or educational purposes
found under Section 170(c)(2)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code and
not have profit making as its primary purpose.112 Vermont was the
first state to statutorily recognize the L3C form in 2008, and many
states have since followed suit by adopting or considering similar
legislation.113 In April 2010, Maryland became the first state to pass
legislation that allows organizations to incorporate as Benefit
Corporations (“B Corporations”), a for-profit legal form with a
commitment to social responsibility.114 As of November 4, 2012,
statutes for B Corporations have been adopted in at least ten states:
California, Louisiana, Illinois, South Carolina, Maryland, New York,
Vermont, Virginia, Hawaii, and New Jersey; B Corporation
legislation is currently under some stage of consideration in at least
fourteen other states and Washington D.C.115
A hybrid form like the L3C or B Corporation could be a good fit
for Burning Man under the laws of Nevada or California (where
Black Rock City LLC’s office is located) in the near future.
Incorporating under the laws of the state in which an organization is
physically located or does most of its business comes with certain
advantages, such as the goodwill it generates in the local community

112. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 3001(27)(A), (B) (2009).
113. Following Vermont’s footsteps, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, North
Carolina,Utah, and Wyoming have enacted legislations recognizing the L3C legal form. See 805
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/1-26 (West 2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1302(C) (2010); ME.
REV. STAT. tit. 31, § 1611 (2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.4102(m) (West 2010); N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 57C-2-01 (West 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-412 (West 2009); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 17-29-102(a)(ix) (West 2010). As of April 2011, state laws allowing the formation
of L3C are pending in Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, North Dakota, Oregon, and
Tennessee. See, e.g., S.B. 1503, 50 Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Az. 2011), available at http://www.
scribd.com/doc/50002464/SB-1503-Senate-Engrossed-Version-Arizona-State-Legislature-viaMyGov365-com.
114. John Tozzi, Maryland Passes ‘Benefit Corp.’ Law for Social Entrepreneurs,
BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 13, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/smallbiz/running_small_ busi
ness/archives/2010/04/benefit_corp_bi.html.
115. Passing Legislation, CERTIFIED B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-bcorps/legislation (last visited Nov. 4, 2012) (showing that as of November 2012, the following
states are working on passing B Corporation legislation: Oregon, Nevada, Arizona, Colorado,
New Mexico, Texas, Alabama, Georgia, Florida, Iowa, Wisconsin, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and
Connecticut); see., e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, §§ 21.01–21.14 (2010).
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and convenience in the event of litigation. Nevertheless, a hybrid
form that proves to be particularly successful and aligned with
Burning Man’s mission still deserves the organizers’ consideration
even if it entails incorporation under the laws of a foreign state. At
this point though, it is still too early to evaluate the merits of the L3C
and B Corporation forms.116

IV. DEFENSE AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BLACK
ROCK CITY LIMITED LIABILITY CORPORATIONS
A. DEFENSE OF BURNING MAN’S LLC ORGANIZATIONAL FORM
The rationales for converting to the nonprofit form in Part III.B,
however legitimate, do not invalidate Burning Man’s viability as a
LLC capable of staying true to its altruistic mission. For one thing, it
makes sense to confer ownership of the LLC to a few individuals who
have contributed substantial capital in the form of steady involvement
and labor since Burning Man’s early days. Even the founders and
patrons of the most idealistic, noncapitalistic intentional communities
have adhered to the custom of conferring community ownership to
the most substantial providers of capital.117 Advocates of co-housing
favor, at least in the beginning stage of new communities, the LLC
form with ownership allocated in proportion to individual
contributions of capital.118
It is true that despite its commitment to decommodification,
Burning Man engages in commercial activities like ticket, ice, and
coffee sales. Commercial activities alone, however, do not mean that
Burning Man is incapable of carrying out its altruistic mission as a
LLC. Profit making can be the means to a not-for-profit end, and
even some nonprofit organizations charge fees for the services they
provide.119 Running the Project in its current magnitude has required
116. Cf. J. William Callison & Allan W. Vestal, The L3C Illusion: Why Low-profit Limited
Liability Companies Will Not Stimulate Socially Optimal Private Foundation Investment in
Entrepreneurial Ventures, 35 VT. L. REV. 273, 274 (2010) (criticizing the L3C as an empty form

without changes to federal program-related investment rules in the Internal Revenue Code).
117. ELLICKSON, supra note 89, at 69–73.
118. Id. at 73; CHRIS SCOTTHANSON & KELLY SCOTTHANSON, THE COHOUSING
HANDBOOK: Building A Place for Community 167–78 (2005).
119. Richard Steinberg & Burton A. Weisbrod, Pricing and Rationing by Nonprofit
Organizations with Distributional Objectives, in TO PROFIT OR NOT TO PROFIT: THE
COMMERCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 65, 66, 81 (Burton A. Weisbrod
ed., 1998).
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an annual budget of roughly $14 million to $15 million in the past two
years, and it is hard to imagine where the bulk of that budget would
come from absent ticket sale revenues. Coffee sales, the justification
for which is admittedly less clear in Burning Man’s no-cash economy,
break even; and the profits from ice sales are given back to the
community as charitable contributions to local organizations.120
With previous adjustments like the nontransferability provision
in its operating agreement and disclosure of expenditures in the
annual AfterBurn Reports, the Burning Man organization has gone
above and beyond the requirements expected of conventional LLCs.
These actions demonstrate that the organization is willing to make
structural changes so as to take a clear stance on its values, increase
organizational transparency, and hold itself generally accountable to
the community’s sentiments on how Burning Man should be run.
Furthermore, it gives back to the community by maintaining a
network of regional leaders who engage with local populations in
cities all over the world and hosting an annual Regional Network
Leadership Summit that supports and connects community leaders.121
It hosts office space for two nonprofits in its San Francisco office
building, promotes art by allocating funding to its nonprofit branch
BRAF, makes cash donations to local civic and charitable
organizations.122 Recently within the last two or three years, Burning
Man’s combined charitable giving have exceeded the maximum level
of charitable giving deductions allowed on its federal tax return; it has
kept on giving anyway without cutting back on the amount of
donations.123 In short, absent concrete evidence of ways in which
Burning Man’s current for-profit form is restricting its altruistic
mission, it seems to be doing just fine as a LLC.
There are a few improvements that the organization can make
for better financial transparency and greater organizational
accountability to the community. The financial charts currently
available in the annual AfterBurn Reports only disclose expenditures,
not ticket sales or other forms of revenues. When I brought up this
issue with Marian Goodell, she told me that the organization has no
120. See DOHERTY, supra note 10, at 123; see Burning Man Board, supra note 30.
121. AfterBurn Report 2010: Regionals Report, BURNING MAN, http://afterburn.
burningman. com/10/communications/regionals.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2012).
122. See AfterBurn Report 2009: Financial Chart, supra note 47 (showing an allocation of
$362,000 to artist honoraria for the 2009 event); Andie Grace, Burning Man’s Charitable
Donations for 2010, THE BURNING BLOG (Dec. 20, 2010), http://blog.burningman.com/
news/burning-mans-charitable-donations-for-2010; Telephone Interview with Marian Goodell,
supra note 34.
123. Telephone Interview with Marian Goodell, supra note 34. Section 170(b)(2)(A) of the
Internal Revenue Code limits charitable contribution deductions to 10 percent of the corporate
taxpayer’s taxable income. I.R.C. § 170(b)(2)(A) (2010).
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problem with increased financial transparency.124
The Special
Recreation Permit the Bureau of Land Management grants to
Burning Man, however, stipulates the maximum average number of
participants allowed per day. If the peak population exceeds this
maximum to the point of overwhelming infrastructural resources, the
organization is required to provide contingency plans to account for
the additional attendants.125
The problem is that since a significant number of participants do
not stay for the full duration of the event, the number of tickets sold
would almost always be greater than the number of Burners
physically present at any given moment. In this context, the
publication of ticket revenues would give an inflated estimate of the
average daily level of attendance, thereby inviting unwarranted
scrutiny from the Bureau of Land Management.
The more
transparent action would be to give full financial disclosure of ticket
sales and negotiate with the Bureau of Land Management to reach a
more realistic estimate of daily attendance. It seems that the Burning
Man organization, in renewing its Special Recreation Permit for 20112015, has already taken such steps in its negotiations with the Bureau
of Land Management.126
The second area for improvement is the current lack of restraint
on organizers’ salaries.
The operating agreement’s nontransferability provision, while a step in the right direction, is not
equivalent to a guarantee against unreasonably excessive
management compensation. To reassure the community against the
possibility of self-dealing in a for-profit legal form, the key organizers
could add another provision to the operating agreement that pledges
to cap their salaries and bonuses (if any) to below a fixed threshold.
A salary cap provision is the functional equivalent of the
nondistribution constraint that characterizes nonprofits.

124. Telephone Interview with Marian Goodell, supra note 34.
125. Burning Man 2011 Special Recreation Permit Stipulations 1, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT.,
http://www.blm.gov/pgdata/etc/medialib/blm/nv/field_offices/winnemucca_field_office/nepa/recr
eation/0.Par.49008.File.dat/2011%20SRP%20Stips.pdf (requiring the 2011 Burning Man to
manage its tickets sales so as to not overtax the infrastructure, which is designed for an average
of 50,000 participants per day).
126. See Letter from Rolando Mendez, Field Manager, Black Rock Field Office, Bureau of
Land Mgmt., to Interested Public (Nov. 1, 2010) (on file with author) (seeking public input on
whether Burning Man’s Special Recreation Permit renewal for 2011-2015 should be allowed to
increase the maximum population size from 50,000 to 60,000 in phases over the five-year span).
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B. THE BENEFITS AND PITFALLS OF NONPROFIT STATUS
With a few adjustments like full financial disclosure, a pledge to
cap its key organizers’ salaries below a fixed threshold, and the
addition of an external advisory group, Black Rock City LLC would
essentially be functioning as a nonprofit. Holding all else equal and
given the rationales for conversion outlined in Part III.B, Burning
Man’s transition to a nonprofit entity shows that as an altruistic
organization evolves and matures, its best choice of organizational
from can transform as well. This Part further analyzes the nonprofit
structure’s benefits and caveats for Burning Man.

1. Preservation of Altruistic Legacy, Tax Benefits, and Access to
Grant Funding
Nonprofits that operate under one of the qualifying purposes set
out in Section 501(c)(3) of the IRC enjoy federal income tax
exemption. As a charitable provider of quasi-public goods and
community enrichment, Burning Man will certainly qualify as a taxexempt 501(c)(3) nonprofit and want to take advantage of the
corresponding tax benefits.127 This will require the specification of at
least one tax-exempt purpose upon formation as a 501(c)(3)
nonprofit, which will commit successive boards of directors to
operating Burning Man in accordance with its founding values as
enshrined in the Ten Principles, thereby preserving its altruistic
legacy beyond the lifetimes of the current LLC members.128 At the
state and local levels, almost all nonprofits are exempt from property,
sales, and corporate income taxation.129 The transition to nonprofit
status would result in a significant tax savings if Black Rock City
LLC, the subsidiary of the newly formed nonprofit, liquidates into the
nonprofit parent entity.130
In addition to tax exemption at the federal, state, and local levels,
private donations to 501(c)(3) nonprofits are tax-deductible up to
specified maximums in the form of percentages of donors’ adjusted
gross incomes.131 This means that Burning Man’s nonprofit status will
127. “Charitability,” one of the exempt purposes set out by Section 501(c)(3), is used in its
generally accepted legal sense and includes, among others things, lessening the burdens of
government and combating community deterioration. Exempt Purposes, I.R.C. § 501(c)(3),
IRS, available at http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Charitable-Organizations/ExemptPurposes---Internal-Revenue-Code-Section-501(c)(3) (last accessed Nov. 10, 2012).
128. E-mail from Marian Goodell, supra note 99.
129. Hansmann V, supra note 61, at 72.
130. Burning Man had paid an estimated annual average of $550,000 in federal and state
taxes during 2008-2010. E-mail from Marian Goodell, supra note 99.
131. See IRS, PUB. NO. 526, CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS, at 13 (2011), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p526.pdf (specifying that the amount of deduction for an
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provide additional incentive for charitable contributions from private
individuals and organizations. As a nonprofit, Burning Man will also
have access to public and private grants that it would not be eligible
for as a for-profit corporation, thereby facilitating the expansion of its
existing altruistic projects.

2. The Caveats of the Nonprofit Form
The nonprofit form alone is not a guarantee of altruistic
commitment. Self-serving nonprofits can thwart the nondistribution
constraint by paying excessive salaries to their managers and
directors. In general, there are more opportunities for abusive
arrangements like self-dealing, nepotism, and favoritism in the
nonprofit sector because it lacks the financially motivated takeover
bids that constrain such abuse in for-profit firms.132 Determining
whether a manager’s compensation is competitive or violates the
nondistribution constraint, which is especially difficult to enforce in
small firms, is no easy task.133 Professor Burton Weisbrod has warned
against the possibility of “for-profits in disguise”—organizations that
act no differently from profit-maximizing firms but elect the nonprofit
form since enforcement is costly and detection is not easy.134 The
government does not devote substantial resources to the monitoring
and enforcement of the nondistribution constraint for nonprofit
organizations; and even if it did, stealthy distributions of excessive
salary to managers and directors can be difficult to detect.135
individual’s charitable contributions is limited to 50 percent of adjusted gross income, and may
be limited to 30 percent or 20 percent of adjusted gross income depending on the type of
property donated and the type of organization receiving the contribution). For corporate
donors, the cap on tax-deductible charitable contributions is 10 percent of taxable income.
I.R.C. § 170(b)(2)(A) (2010).
132. Steinberg & Weisbrod, supra note 120, at 76. Cf. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Ideals Versus
Dollars: Donors, Charity Managers, and Government Grants, 95 J. POLIT. ECON. 810 (1987)
(arguing that a lump-sum increase in grant funding will reduce the organization’s accountability
to private donors and not go entirely toward an increase in output).
133. Weisbrod, supra note 59, at 72.
134. BURTON A. WEISBROD, THE NONPROFIT ECONOMY 11–13 (1988).
135. Steinberg, Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organizations, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR:
A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 126 (Walter W. Powell ed., 2006). Accord Norman I. Silber,
Nonprofit Interjurisdictionality, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 613, 638–39 (2005) (suggesting that
inadequate monitoring and enforcement of nonprofit law results, at least in part, from the
overlap of state and federal authorities and from their failure to formally assign principal
responsibilities). Both federal and state laws impose limitations on nonprofit compensation.
Private inurement rules, which forbid the private ownership of nonprofits in any degree, are
enforced at the federal level by both Treasury regulations and an excise tax imposed on
organization insiders who violate the prohibitions. At the state level, this prohibition is
generally imposed through statutory nondistribution requirements for nonprofits. Lloyd
Hitoshi Mayer, The “Independent” Sector: Fee-for-Service Charity and the Limits of
Autonomy, 65 VAND. L. REV. 51, 95 (2012); see I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3), 4958 (2006 & Supp. I 2007);
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(4), (c)(2) (2008). In addition to limitations on the reasonableness
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The second pitfall of nonprofits is that they are not immune from
commercialization. A number of nonprofits have started to behave
more like for-profits by increasingly relying on fees and contracts and
less on donations and grants to fund their core missions.136 Holding
all else equal, greater access to donations and grants translates to a
greater ability to offer lower ticket prices and subsidized tickets; it
seems then that the Burning Man organization has a duty to its
community of participants and volunteers to resist commercialization
without good reason. Commercialization in and of itself does not
have a to be a source of alarm, as nonprofits with significant sources
of commercial funding can still stay true to altruistic missions.
Burning Man after all is funded primarily by ticket sales and there is
no evidence that this commercial aspect of its operation has crippled
its altruistic commitment. However, if the Project takes its pledge to
decommodification seriously, and if part of the rationale for its LLCto-nonprofit transition is increased access to grant funding and
donations, then its organizers should not only understand but also
anticipate the factors driving the trend toward commercialization in
the nonprofit sector.
The trend toward commercialization among nonprofit art
museums may serve as an appropriate case study for Burning Man’s
future management.
Art museums are unlike healthcare
organizations or science and technology museums in that they neither
depend on the government as the primary financial customer nor
compete with for-profits; it is therefore less obvious why art museums
would gravitate toward commercial funding over donations and
grants.137 Four possible reasons have been proposed for the
commercialization of nonprofit art museums. First, new resources
often support specific acquisitions or projects rather than general
operations, but the resulting expansion increases the museum’s
operating costs nonetheless. Second, personnel costs make up a large
part of art museums’ operating expenses, but patrons often prefer to
of nonprofit executive pay and private inurement restrictions, there is a third type of federal
limitation on nonprofit compensation: Treasury regulations also impose private benefit
restrictions that protect the charitable purposes of nonprofits and prohibit anything other than
incidental benefits to private parties. James R. Hines, Jr. et al., The Attack on Nonprofit Status:
A Charitable Assessment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1179, 1195 & n.74 (2010); see Treas. Reg. §
1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (2008).
136. J. Gregory Dees, Enterprising Nonprofits, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan. 1, 1998, at 54, 55–56.
For a collection of studies on the reasons and consequences of why nonprofits are behaving
more like for-profit firms by shifting primary funding sources from charitable donations to
commercial activities, see generally TO PROFIT OR NOT TO PROFIT: THE COMMERCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR (Burton A. Weisbrod ed., 1998).
137. Helmut K. Anheier & Stefan Toepler, Commerce and the Muse: Art Museums
Becoming Commercial?, in TO PROFIT OR NOT TO PROFIT: THE COMMERCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 233, 235 (Burton A. Weisbrod ed., 1998).
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direct their donations and grants to specific projects like collections or
buildings instead. Third, the museum’s vision and the funding needs
that vision entails are not always in line with the goals of private and
institutional donors, thereby making alternative financing necessary.
Finally, government support for the arts seems to have reached its
peak in the 1990s before its subsequent decline.138
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BURNING MAN’S FUTURE
This Part summarizes the recommendations made thus far for
these three phases of Burning Man’s operation: the current LLC, the
LLC-to-nonprofit conversion, and the future nonprofit entity.
Organizational transparency is a recurrent theme in the
recommendations to follow. In its current capacity as a LLC, Black
Rock City can improve organizational accountability by making a full
disclosure of finances in its annual AfterBurn Reports and by adding
a provision that caps management compensation to a reasonable level
to its operating agreement. If the reason behind the current partial
financial disclosure is that the publication of ticket revenues would
inflate the estimate of average daily attendance and invite
unnecessary attention from the Bureau of Land Management, then
the accountable solution is to negotiate with the Bureau of Land
Management a more realistic method of estimating attendance, not to
omit the disclosure of ticket revenues altogether. Similar to the
nondistribution constraint that characterizes nonprofits, a provision
that ensures against excessive management compensation would give
extra reassurance to the Burning Man community that a for-profit
organization can still credibly serve its altruistic purposes.
As the Project transitions to a nonprofit structure, organizers
should make sure that the conversion process is transparent. In the
event that organizers decide to liquidate the LLC after it is
transferred into the nonprofit, they should be mindful that the phase
in which the nonprofit entity acquires the LLC by buying its
ownership from the LLC’s members is especially prone to abuse. The
Burning Man organization should take extra care to communicate to
the community that the acquisition price paid is reasonable, and also
to disclose the metrics used for determining reasonableness.
Continued vigilance toward transparency is necessary even after
138. Id. at 236–37. See Toby Miller, The National Endowment for the Arts in the 1990s, 43
AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1429, 1441–43 (2000) (citing a decline in corporate support of the arts
during the 1990s and criticizing the National Endowment for the Arts as an inadequate
supporter of democratic cultural capital because of its tendency to prioritize institutional Old
World values over immigrant and popular culture).
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Burning Man fully transitions to a nonprofit entity, because the
nonprofit form is not immune from abusive practices and
commercialization.
Admittedly, commercial sources of funding like ticket sales are
sometimes necessary and not contrary to altruistic missions. That
said, if an organization is committed to decommodification and
changes its legal form partially to access previous unavailable grants
and donations so as to expand the scale of its altruistic mission, it
should be wary of, and resist, commercialization absent good cause.
Finally, BRAF, Burning Man’s nonprofit branch dedicated to the
funding of art projects, should stay a separate entity after the parent
organization fully converts to a nonprofit structure. There are
conceivably private and institutional donors who are only or primarily
interested in supporting the Project’s artistic component, but Burning
Man’s mission is broader than the advancement of the arts. Keeping
BRAF as a separate nonprofit entity has the benefit of retaining the
support from this narrower segment of the donor pool for Burning
Man’s future.

V. CONCLUSION
An organization like Burning Man that is not driven by profit but
ideologically committed to altruism and the provision of public goods
can still thrive in a for-profit form. The nonprofit form is not the only
or even the best structure for such organizations, particularly if they
are young organizations in the early days of formation. As an
organization evolves and becomes more complex overtime, however,
the organization form that best serves its mission can change as well.
In Burning Man’s case, the need to credibly signal its commitment to
altruism and access to public subsidies are persuasive rationales for its
current conversion to nonprofit status. Still, the nonprofit form alone
is neither a guarantee of altruistic commitment nor an immunization
from self-dealing practices among the management staff or board of
directors. Burning Man can improve organizational accountability by
making the LLC-to-nonprofit conversion process transparent to the
community, and resisting commercialization absent good cause after
it becomes a fully functional nonprofit organization.
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